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Abstract 
The purpose of study is to evaluate the challenges of IGAD-led peace process of South Sudan. Its objective is to 
evaluate and assess the challenges surrounding the South Sudan peace process mediated by the IGAD-led team. 
To address these objectives, the researcher employed qualitative research design to make use of its advantage in 
gaining detailed information about the issue, to examine reflections, understandings and knowledge of 
negotiators and refugees by offering an in-depth understanding of a particular problem and challenges. South 
Sudan became an independent state from the Sudan in July 9, 2011, following an internationally monitored 
referendum, which was held on 9 January. However, almost after three years of independence, the world newest 
state backslide into the horrific civil war on 15, December 2013, due to the power rivalry within SPLM/A. The 
war resulted in the massive loss of human life and property destruction. Consequently, the regional organization, 
IGAD swiftly launched the peace process on Saturday 4th January 2014, in order to halt the crisis in South 
Sudan. Nevertheless, the peace process faced enormous internal and external challenges during the peace talk 
and also at present the Joint Monitoring and Evolution Commission (JMEC) is facing impediment in the 
implementation process. Based on the findings of this study, the researcher recommends the concerned bodies 
such as the IGAD, AU, IGAD-Plus and UN should exert pressure on both warring parties so as to speed up the 
implementation process of Peace Agreement because the South Sudanese are suffering by intense security 
problems and food crisis associated with the conflict up until now. Besides, the international community should 
keep out, those who are uncompromising and create impediment to the implementation of the peace accord, from 
the rank of Transitional Government of National Unity (TGONU). Because the evidences indicate that both 
belligerent parties leaders are not portrayed their political will and good faith to implement the Peace Concord. 
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Introduction 
The recent conflict in South Sudan traced its origins back to the colonial past. The seeds of the wars have been 
sown by the Turko-Egyptian and Anglo-Egyptian colonial rulers that administrated North and South Sudan 
separately, which resulted in decades of civil wars between North and South Sudan (Yohannes, 2015:49). 
Therefore, the first civil war that broke out on August 18, 1955, during the eve of Sudan’s independence from 
the Anglo-Egyptian administration on January 1, 1956 was to end for 17 years (Ibd, 3), in 1972, by signing the 
Addis Ababa Agreement, between the North and South, with recognizing the ethnic diversity of the Sudan. The 
Agreement granted the regional autonomy and comparative representation in the national assembly for South, 
however, in 1983 the second north-south war was to break out, when the government in part under pressure from 
Islamists, effectively abrogated the Addis Ababa Agreement by reversing the 1973 commitments on Islam and 
use of Arabic in the South as well as weakening the federal arrangement (Berghof Foundation for Peace Support, 
2006:13; AUCISS, 2014).  
The War was fought between the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) of the South and the 
Northern government based in the capital Khartoum was brought to an end by the 2005 Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement (CPA) in Naivasha, Kenya. The agreement was brokered by the United States, several European 
countries and IGAD. The CPA sought to address many issues, such as power and wealth sharing, security 
arrangements etc, in spite of the label, it is not a comprehensive peace and it has not been able to stop armed 
conflicts within various regions of Sudan. While the war was declared ended in the south by the signing of the 
CPA (Abdelnour, etal 2008:7-8). 
The CPA agreement established a six-year interim period, beginning July 9th 2005, where Southern 
Sudanese would govern their own regional affairs and participate equally in the national government (Daoud, 
2012:45). The agreement also specified an important provision for referendum in 2011, to determine whether the 
majority of the southern populations will have opted to split the southern territories from the north or remain 
united (Abdelnour, etal 2008:8).  Accordingly, the southerners were disposed to secession due to the poor 
implementation of CPA on many fronts and other above-mentioned factors. On February 14th 2011, the first 
official referendum results were declared. As expected, the South Sudanese overwhelmingly voted for partition. 
On July 9th, the South Sudan celebrated its official independence from Sudan forming The Republic of South 
Sudan, Africa’s newest state (Daoud, 2012:49). 
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However, nearly after three years of independence South Sudan relapse into civil war on 15 December 2013 
because of the power struggle within the SPLM/A, which later escalated into violence conflict and mass killing. 
The violence has largely been committed by Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) and the Sudan People’s 
Liberation Movement/Army in Opposition (SPLM/A-IO), with both sides using armed groups and militias in the 
conduct of hostilities. 
In an attempt to stop this crisis, the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), immediately 
launched the peace talk by selecting the three envoys such as Seyoum Mesfin of Ethiopia, Lazarus Sumbeiywo 
of Kenya and Mohammed El Dhabi of Sudan. As a result, the IGAD-led mediation of first round talks between 
the warring parties was held in the Ethiopian capital, Addis Ababa, on Saturday 4th January 2014. But the 
IGAD-led mediation of peace process later declared into IGAD-Plus, (which included the Troika countries (USA, 
UK and Norway), the UN, the AU, the EU, China and the IGAD Partners Forum (IPF) because of the team was 
faced various internal and external challenges during the peace process. Nevertheless, the belligerent parties 
eventually were signed the peace agreement in August 2015, due to the IGAD-Plus pressure. 
Therefore, this document has assessed the internal and external challenges that the IGAD-facilitated peace 
process of South Sudan confronted during the peace talk and the prospects of peace agreement in ensuring 
lasting peace for South Sudanese. The paper also to some extent examined the ongoing process of 
implementation of peace agreement led by Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (JMEC). 
 
Statement of the problem of the study 
South Sudan declared its independence in July 2011, after the protracted civil wars with Sudan. But almost after 
the three years’ independence, the world newest nation was dragged to the brutal civil war in December 2013, 
which caused enormous death, destruction and displacement of the people of South Sudan which triggered by 
power struggle within SPLM/A. 
According to, (Gil, 2014:4) the SPLM convened its Second National Convention in 2008, which was the 
first since the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). In that conference, symptom of power 
struggle appeared as Riek Machar wanted to compete for the SPLM chairmanship, a position that would make 
him president in the 2010 expected elections. But President Salva Kiir desired to maintain his position. These 
circumstances precipitated to violent conflict that broke out in South Sudan in July 2013. The political turmoil 
launched when President Salva Kiir announced a chief cabinet reshuffle in which Vice-president Riek Machar 
and Pagan Amum, the Secretary General of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), and other key 
officials were abdicated from office. This political action demonstrated the apparent fissure within the Sudan 
People's Liberation Movement. The dismissed leaders of SPLM in their part charged in press conference 
President Kiir of using repressive behavior violating the party and national constitutions. After long 
postponement National Liberation Council was held on 14 December where President Kiir again approved 
Pagan Amum's dismissal and abolition of secret balloting. The dismissed officials and their followers refused the 
next day session, and then the armed conflict started that evening between the Nuer and the Dinka factions of the 
presidential Guard in Juba. 
Following this crisis the IGAD quickly convened an emergency summit of the Assembly of Heads of State 
and Government on December 27, 2013 in the Kenyan capital Nairobi. As anticipated, this meeting helped in 
forging what was chiefly regarded, and rightly so, as a critical regional response to the crisis, basically showing 
its commitment to mediate between South Sudan’s warring parties. To immediately start the envisaged 
mediation process, the summit ensured that Seyoum Mesfin of Ethiopia, Lazarus Sumbeiywo of Kenya and 
Mohammed El Dhabi of Sudan were chosen as exceptional emissaries (Akol, 2014:3). 
Subsequently, the first round of peace talks between the warring parties began in January 2014 (Ibid), a few 
weeks after the fighting broke out, hosted by regional bloc in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, the talks were focused on 
attempts to immediately end the fighting and all the death and obliteration that it was causing (Blanchard, 
2014:1). In consequence of, on 23 January 2014, the cessation of agreement was signed between the parties in 
conflict, in order to halt the conflict and fighting between them. However, the regional rivalries and power 
struggles; the centralization of decision-making at the HoS level and associated lack of institutionalization within 
IGAD as we as the expanding peace process beyond South Sudan’s political elites were the major factors which 
remain challenges and limited IGAD's mediation efforts (International Crisis Group, 2015:i). 
Despite the signing of the cessation of hostilities between the warring parties, the peace process was 
unsuccessful in ending the conflict and fighting between warring parties. Because the unwillingness of the two 
Antagonist parties to respect what they have pledged and signed for in the peace deals as it was seen in their 
repeated backslid into conflict. Accordingly, Later IGAD- PLUS was declared in March 2015 following the 
fifteen months of unsuccessful mediation of the crisis (International Crisis Group, 2015:3). The IGAD-PLUS’ 
approach to the mediation is shaped by two reasons: firstly, that the parties are unwilling to come to an 
agreement without pressure and secondly, that IGAD would need to call on the weight of the wider international 
community to exert the necessary pressure in a coordinated manner (International Crisis Group, 2015:4). 
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Therefore, the researcher wants to evaluate the internal and external challenges that the IGAD-led peace 
process of South Sudan faced during the peace mediation and at present the Joint Monitoring and Evaluation 
Commission facing in the implementation process of the peace Agreement as well as to examine the reflections 
of different participant and concerned bodies concerning the stumbling blocks as well as the overall 
circumstance of the peace process of South Sudan. 
 
Objectives 
General objective 
The general objective of this study is to inquiry and understands the challenges of IGAD-led peace process of the 
South Sudan during peace deal and in the implementation phase of Peace Agreement by Joint Monitoring and 
Evaluation Commission (JMEC) and to examine and assess the reflections of different stakeholders and 
participants regarding the stumbling blocks of peace procedure. 
 
Specific Objectives 
•  To indentify and analyze the internal and external challenges of IGAD-led peace process   of South 
Sudan during the peace negotiation. 
•  To assesses the impediments that Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (JMEC) facing in the 
implementation process of the Peace Agreement. 
• To examine the reflections of various participants and stakeholders concerning the stumbling blocks as 
well as to evaluate the overall circumstance of the peace process of South Sudan. 
 
Research Questions 
This study addressed the following research questions: - 
• What are the internal and external challenges of IGAD-led peace process of South Sudan during peace 
talks? 
• What are the obstacles which Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (JMEC) confronting in the 
implementation process of Peace Accord? 
• What are the reflections of different interlocutors and concerning bodies about the stumbling blocks and 
overall scenario of peace process of South Sudan? 
 
Significance of the Study 
It is important in creating awareness about the challenges that the IGAD-led mediation team faced during the 
peace process in South Sudan present conflict resolution. Moreover, the study gives knowledge about the 
challenges in the implementation process of peace agreement as well as the prospect of peace agreement in 
ensuring sustainable peace in the South Sudan by Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (JMEC). 
Furthermore, the study serves as a reference for other researchers, academicians, practitioners, government 
and non-governmental organizations in future investigation particularly for those who are interested in conflict 
resolution activities. 
 
Scope of the study 
It is limited in terms of trying to map and evaluate the challenges of IGAD-led Peace process of South Sudan 
during the peace talk and up to the initial stage of the implementation of the peace agreement by Joint 
Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (JMEC). 
 
Research Methodology 
Research Design 
The researcher employed qualitative research design. The reason for choosing qualitative research design is 
mainly because of its advantage in gaining detailed information about the issue, as stated by Creswell (2007). 
Qualitative research is also concerned with qualitative phenomenon i.e phenomena relating to quality rather than 
quantity and it is also concerned with subjective assessment of attitudes, opinions and behavior (Kothari, 2004:5). 
Therefore, this research method helped the researcher to explore reflections, understandings and knowledge of 
negotiators and refugees by offering an in-depth understanding of a particular problem and challenges rather than 
presenting it with numerical representation. 
The purpose of this research has been to explore and assess the challenges that IGAD-led mediation faced 
during the peace process and in the implementation stage of peace agreement. Hence, this research is descriptive 
research. According to Kothari (2004:2) the major purpose of descriptive research is description of the state of 
affairs as it exists at present and fact finding enquiries of different kinds. Descriptive research sets out to describe 
and to interpret what is or was. It looks at individuals, groups, institutions, methods and materials in order to 
describe, compare, contrast, classify, analyze and interpret the entities (Abiy, et al 2009). 
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Therefore, the researcher selected and employed this method to report the challenges that the IGAD-led 
mediation team has confronted during the peace process and at present in the implementation stage the Joint 
Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (JMEC) is facing. 
 
Sampling Techniques and Sample Size 
Purposive sampling method was used to select research participants who were concerned persons of the study. 
According to Patton (2002) Purposeful sampling is a technique widely used in qualitative research for the 
identification and selection of information rich cases for the most effective use of limited resources as cited by 
Palinkas, et al (2013:2). In other word, purposive sampling is also known by different names such as Non-
probability sampling, deliberate sampling and judgment sampling. In this kind of sampling, items for the sample 
are selected deliberately by the researcher (Kothari, 2004:59). This sampling technique was used as a means to 
select research participants. This was purposively done in order to understand the reflections, understanding and 
knowledge of negotiators and refugees that owned in the peace process in depth. 
Moreover, the researcher used snowball sampling method in order to get knowledgeable and experience 
participant in the peace process. Snowball sampling (also called network, chain referral, or reputational sampling) 
is a method for identifying and selecting the cases in a network. It begins with one or a few people and spreads 
out on the basis of links to the initial cases or one research participant refers another, and that person refers 
another, and that person refers another. According to Berg (2001) Snowballing is sometimes the best way to 
locate subjects with certain attributes or characteristics necessary in a study. The researcher got the research 
participants in this way to conduct in-depth interview. 
Therefore, totally ten participants were participated in this interview through face-to-face interview and 
email interview. The participants were selected from different categories of stakeholders in the peace process (i.e. 
from the government, the opposition, the IGAD, the civil societies and the refugees). 
 
Data Collection Methods 
Relevant data were obtained from primary sources and secondary sources. According to Kothari (2004:95) 
primary data are those which are collected afresh and for the first time, and thus happen to be original in 
character. Hence the methods of gathering primary entail; interview, observation, questionnaires, content 
analysis and etc. primary data was gathered through in depth interview. In depth interview is appropriate to 
gather data in detail for the qualitative research as Suggested by Creswell (2007). 
Moreover, the researcher extensively used secondary sources such as books, thesis, journals, agreement 
documents and reports. Secondary data means data that are already available i.e. they refer to the data which 
have already been collected and analyzed by someone else (Kothari, 2004:95). Therefore, the research tried to 
consult these sources to compile this study. 
 
In-depth Interview 
Scholars like Denzin (1978) and Spradley (1979) as cited by Bruce (2001) define interview as simply as a 
conversation with a purpose of gaining information. The primary purpose is to gain relevant information from 
the stand point of the research objective and to gain constructive view from participants in the research. 
It is often used as a method of generating data for understanding people’s knowledge, experiences, opinions, 
beliefs, needs, perceptions, and constraints. It can be categorized as structured, semi-structured or unstructured in 
their settings (Robson, 1993). Therefore, the researcher conducted in depth interview with selected participants 
who were participated in the peace process and other stakeholders. Triangulations were used to make the data 
more credible and valid, crosschecking information from different stakeholder and participants in the peace 
process (Government, Opposition, Refugees, Civil societies and IGAD). Hence, the researcher interviewed 
different individuals using the interview guidelines to triangulate the data from different directions. In-depth 
interviews were conducted with ten key informants. These in depth interview participants were selected 
purposively based on their knowledge and understanding they have in the peace process.  
  
Data Analysis  
The researcher analyzed the data by using qualitative method in a thematic way. For this purpose, the researcher 
follow certain steps first the researcher recorded all interviewees’ voice by tape record during data collection and 
later the researcher transcribed manually after repeatedly listening recorded voice of interviewees. For the 
purpose of accuracy of data analysis, codes were given to each research participants by giving pseudonyms or 
false names for actual participants for anonymity in this stage. 
Second stage was separating and extracting significant statements that pertain directly to 
the peace process. In this stage of analysis, the transcripts were read and reread to separate words and sentences 
of participants’ reflection on the peace process using color by highlighter pen to identify significant words, 
phrases and statements of particular participants during transcribing 
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on hard paper. 
Third step of data analysis was formulating meanings for significant statements. Under this stage the 
researcher sorted similar ideas of in depth interview participants to formulate meanings of peace process based 
on highlighted significant statements of participants. Fourth step of data analysis was categorization of 
formulated meanings of peace process. In this stage the researcher formed sub themes to write analysis of peace 
process and the researcher did accordingly. Following the thematic area the entire data transcripts were re-
arranged. This is because Strauss, et al (1998) argued that events, happenings, actions/interactions that are found 
to be conceptually similar in nature or related in meaning are grouped under more abstract concepts which are 
termed as categories.  
Fifth stage of analysis was integrating the findings into thorough description of the fact being studied. In 
this stage, the already arranged and organized data were set to be analyzed by triangulation the data which were 
gathered by two major methods such as primary and secondary sources. Because triangulation increases validity 
by incorporating several viewpoints and methods in social science research as stated by Sabina, et al (2012). 
Social science reality is so complex that it is impossible to be captured by a single way of data collection or 
technique that needs triangulations of data analysis from different sources. According to Patton (2002), 
triangulation strengthens a study by combining different methods. Hence, the researcher analyzed data by 
triangulation from primary and secondary sources. 
The findings from these two sources were integrated in places where it is necessary by describing the fact of 
the peace process. Analysis of data was made by giving greater emphasis for subjective reality of participants’ 
experiences in the study. 
  
Analysis and Interpretation 
The beginning of the peace process of South Sudan 
Following the spoiling for a fight broke out in December 2013, the Intergovernmental Authority on 
Development (IGAD), a regional organization swiftly mandated three mediators to broker a peace deal between 
Salva Kiir and Riek Machar (Koos, et al 2014:2). But Starting from July of 2013, when Salva Kiir disband his 
entire cabinet, a number of initiative have been in place, it was very clear from that point on that if he sacked his 
entire cabinet, will be possibility that they going to run travel is extremely high. So from the very beginning 
there was moves within the region mostly bilateral moves between the countries of the region, many mission that 
went to South Sudan, they tried that Salva, what he just did, so that conversation was going on, so there was 
some initiative almost bilateral between countries. Because, Dr. Tewodros Adhanom went there some point and 
another conversation was made with Uhuru kenyata is there just tried and get Salva Kiir specifically more about 
the decision had made.   
So the first move would be around December 17, 2013, when Dr. Tederowos Adhanom, the Ethiopia 
Foreign Minister, under the IGAD council of ministers went down to Juba to understand from Salva Kiir various 
issues especially focusing on his initiation to resolve the conflict as soon as possible. This was very fast initiative 
after 15 December 2013. On 26 December, 2013 his excellence, Haile Mariam Desalegn the chairman of IGAD 
and his excellence Uhuru Kenyata the rapporteur of IGAD went to South Sudan. Therefore, the evidences 
indicated that there were aforementioned initiatives before IGAD started the peace talk. 
Thus, the peace process was launched as a result of the outbreak of the conflict in South Sudan. Following 
the outburst of fighting, IGAD quickly convened an emergency summit of the Assembly of Heads of State and 
Government on December 27, 2013 in the Kenyan capital Nairobi. As anticipated, this meeting helped in forging 
what was chiefly regarded, and rightly so, as a critical regional response to the crisis, basically showing its 
commitment to mediate between South Sudan’s warring parties. To immediately start the envisaged mediation 
process, the summit ensured that Seyoum Mesfin of Ethiopia, Lazarus Sumbeiywo of Kenya and Mohammed El 
Dhabi of Sudan were chosen as exceptional emissaries (Akol, 2014:3). 
Besides the selection of the said peace envoys, the IGAD December summit also highlighted the need to 
have an inclusive peace process. Subsequently, the peace talks between the warring parties began in January 
2014 (Ibid), a few weeks after the fighting broke out, hosted by regional bloc in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, the talks 
were focused on attempts to immediately end  the fighting and all the death and obliteration that it was causing 
(Blanchard, 2014:1). IGAD Council of Ministers met in the Kenyan capital, Nairobi, on 27th December 2013, 
and called for an IGAD-led peace process for South Sudan, and the first round of the talks was held in the 
Ethiopian capital, Addis Ababa, on Saturday 4th January 2014. 
Therefore, the Negotiators to the South Sudan Peace Talks were mainly: The warring parties, the 
Government of the Republic of South Sudan and the SPLM-SPLA in Opposition. They were the first parties to 
the peace talks. Later the Former Political Detainees were included, and then the other stakeholders: the Faith-
based group made up of religious leaders from the South Sudan Council of Churches (SSCC) representing 
Christians and leaders from the South Sudan Islamic Council representing Muslims in South Sudan. Also the 
civil society organizations (CSOs) from South Sudan (those under government controlled areas) and those under 
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the Opposition’s controlled area, and those from the Diaspora were also allowed to take part in the negotiations. 
Other participants included the Women’s Bloc, Eminent Personalities from South Sudan. Generally, there were 
seven groups of participants and the total number of participants was about “89” delegates all together. 
 
The Agendas of Peace Process  
Almost all interviewees responded that the agenda of the peace process are formulated by IGAD-mediators 
together with the parties to the conflict. Hence, as one respondent from civil society alluded that the agenda 
included negotiations to end the conflict, study of the root causes of the conflict, how did the war start, and what 
would be the solution to the conflict. The agenda produced an Agreement called “Agreement on the Resolution 
of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan”. On the other hand, the interviewee from the government side 
noted that the main agenda should bring peace to South Sudan. But in order to bring peace for South Sudan they 
have to understand each party, their demands and points of conversation or points of agreement. The agenda 
which was presented supposed to reform institutions, cessation of hostilities and ceasefire and open corridors of 
humanitarian system. 
On the contrary, also from the opposition side stated that the SPLM/A in opposition were looking for 
federal system. They want the federal system to be incorporated in hand to reach the peace agreement. Secondly, 
they need the reform for all government institutions. The third one is, they need the government to pay money 
for those who were killed and the property that were damaged in the war. Lastly, the SPLM/A in opposition 
needed two separate army force. 
On the one hand, the respondent from the civil society’s side noted that the efforts were to convince the 
warring parties to cessation of hostilities, to stop fighting and to negotiate. This is the main issue during the 
peace process. 
According to Fok (2014:5) from the beginning what was important was to cease the killings. As a result, the 
government delegation to the Addis Ababa-based negotiations demanded on the talks being limited to the 
warring parties that the quickest way to end the violence was a direct dialogue between the government and the 
opposition. But the rebels, the donors and the civil society organization pushed for an inclusive approach. The 
oppositions were at this time talking about change in power, and justice and accountability for the incident of 
violence that took place in Juba when the fighting broke out. Further, the insurgent talk about political strategies 
of each party, with opposition underscoring a commitment to institutional reforms, democracy, tackling 
corruption and changes in the system of governance (Ibid). 
Therefore, the issue of approval of the peace agenda by the both parties is very controversial, because the 
respondents react different views. Some say that the agendas were accepted by both parties and the other say that 
the agenda were not accepted particularly by the government. As one of interviewee from the government side 
says that both parties want peace in any conflict, they want to have peace that is favor to their terms but what it 
mean the peace agreement that it been signed really to be honesty trying, was not acceptable by the government 
and even by the opposition parties, because the people were pressure to sign it, so it sign the parties prefer that to 
be given negotiate, so that they get peace agendas that they can be happy to sign and be happy to implement. 
This always imposed because the mediators under pressure, the parties to the conflict under pressure, the region 
under pressure and the continental organization under pressure, so they have to sign it. However, as one of 
interviewee from the civil societies side described that the agenda items presented were accepted by the parties 
because they participated in drafting these agenda items. 
In addition, one of the respondents alluded that they negotiated and discussed. They had negotiators, there 
were observers and the civil societies members. The inclusivity is there and it is clear. The inclusivity was 
achieved through study of influential groups in the country. This helped in the negotiation process during and 
outside roundtable talks. There were attempt to influence the two warring parties on the issue of cessation of 
hostilities and then gradually the government made an agreement on August 26, 2015. 
 
The Challenges of the Peace Process 
The peace process faces numerous internal and external challenges before and after signed the “Agreement on 
the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan”. According to, Yohannes (2015:52) challenges 
that destabilize the efforts of solving the conflict before reaching to an agreement was the unwillingness of the 
two Antagonist parties to respect what they have pledged and signed for in the peace deals as it was seen in their 
repeated backslid into conflict.  As one interviewee from civil society said that much of the reason for the delay 
of peace agreement was the internal factor, which is lack of trust and the absence of give and take spirit, this zero 
sum game type of thing in both of the leaders of the warring parties. It was disheartening. According to him that 
there was no any serious outside challenge, although the Ugandan army was there to uphold the government side. 
But this was not mean much they insisted that to protect the capital city from falling apart say that they were 
doing a middleman's jobs and so on, but it was difficult, however, it was not the most serious external challenge. 
He noted that there was no visible and serious outside challenge. The main challenge came from intransigence 
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and inflexibility of the warring parties leaders, who knew each other more than anyone else. They became very 
stubborn. 
Additionally, among the eleven political detainees the rest four are remained in detention and under trial of 
treason which is detrimental for solving the conflict. The other challenge was existence of various armed 
opposition groups often with competing interests and the need to accommodate their interests in the mediation 
agenda so as to outcome an all-inclusive lasting solution for the conflict makes the mediation efforts challenging 
(Yohannes, 2015: 52). 
Moreover, the fright of being accountable for the ethnic killing leaders in the top rank caused in their past 
and present contention for power might constrain their genuine commitment to find solution for the conflict 
(Ibid). According to Awolich (2015:7) the serious challenges to the IGAD mediation had been the fact that the 
mediators did not simply understand the power of momentum and the mediation seemingly suffered from lack of 
full mandate and independence. This is assumed from the fact that the mediators hardly tried to resolve any 
stalemates with the parties. Instead, they consulted the Heads of State and Government whenever hurdles were 
hit. 
The other challenges were the contending interests and different ways of the IGAD member states pursued 
beyond the IGAD-led mediation process against the efforts to solve the conflict, particularly those who involved 
in the peace process (Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan and Uganda). So there was no unity among IGAD member states 
during the peace process (Yohannes, 2015: 52). 
Furthermore, the other problem was on power sharing the government initially wanted 70% of the 
ministerial portfolios in the transitional government of national unity, whereas the SPLM-SPLA in Opposition 
wanted 70% too. But they were pressured to make compromises which indeed they made and came to accept 
53% for the Government and 33% for the SPLMSPLA in Opposition, and the former Political Detainees, and the 
other political parties were given each 7% of power sharing in the Transitional Government of National Unity. 
Additionally, on the side of the Government, President Salva Kiir issued a decree in December 2015, 
creating 28 new states which contradict the provisions of the Peace Agreement that recognizes ten states. 
Therefore, the SPLM/A-in Opposition and the international community rejected the creation of the 28-states 
because they violate the provisions of the Peace Agreement. The Intergovernmental Authority on Development 
(IGAD), the regional political bloc that supervises South Sudan’s peace talks, on 31 January 2016, asked the 
GRSS to suspend its plan to implement the 28 states, claiming that Kiir’s decree was contradictory with the 
August peace agreement (HSBASSS, 2016:4). 
Internally also the government did not withdraw its forces outside the National capital Juba, as stipulated in 
the Peace Agreement. In the agreement all military forces within Juba shall be redeployed outside a radius of 
25km from the center of the national capital beginning thirty days after the signing of this Agreement and 
complete after ninety days (IGAD, 2015: 24). Juba the national capital of South Sudan was supposed to be 
demilitarized after the signing of the Agreement by the Parties, but did not happen because the government did 
not withdraw the forces outside the capital. 
Moreover, according to Mogae (2016:2) the chairperson of Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission 
(JMEC) report that the pre-transitional period of 90 days provided in the Agreement ended without the formation 
of the Transitional Government of National Unity (TGoNU) due to the absence of the SPLM/A-in Opposition 
from the first meeting of JMEC on 27 November 2015. During that time, they had not returned to Juba for 
several reasons including a dispute between the Parties over the size of the advance team delegation contributed 
to the Commission’s inability to meet quorum. Unfortunately, disputes over the representation of other political 
parties continue to limit the inclusiveness of representation in the process envisaged by the Agreement. Other 
political parties remain unrepresented at JMEC as well as in other key institutions where their participation was 
foreseen. 
The other major disagreement was on the power sharing between the government and the First Vice 
President during the Transitional Period. The President cannot take decisions without consulting the Vice-
President. During the Transitional Period, on the side of security arrangements the Opposition wanted to have 
two separate armies. The government wanted one unified army. The Opposition said they don’t trust the 
government and the army in Juba, which has killed civilians in Juba, Malakal, Bor and Bentiu during the time 
when the conflict broke out on 15th December 2013. So the Opposition wanted to have two-armies during the 
transitional period. They said its army would guarantee the implementation of the Peace Agreement and avoid 
the government abrogate the agreement. While the government on the contrary couldn't accept separate armies, 
and accused the Opposition of a plan to stage a rebellion. Eventually, this stalemate was settled during the 
IGAD-PLUS mediation, they agreed to have two separate armies during the 30-month-transitional period. 
Therefore, IGAD-PLUS’ approach to the mediation is shaped by two reasons. Firstly, that the parties were 
unwilling to come to an agreement without pressure and secondly, that IGAD would need to call on the weight 
of the wider international community to exert the necessary pressure in a coordinated manner (International 
Crisis Group, 2015:4). IGAD-PLUS was announced in order to give maximum pressure to the warring parties. 
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Indeed, it was because of IGAD-PLUS that was why the parties were able to reach a peace agreement by the 
17th August 2015. 
Externally, the parties to the conflict accused foreign forces of interests in South Sudan conflict. Parties 
accused regional powers such as Sudan and Uganda of involvement in the conflict. Sudan was accused by the 
government of South Sudan of supporting the armed opposition (The SPLM-SPLA in Opposition), and the 
SPLM-SPLA in Opposition accused Uganda of involvement in South Sudan conflict by openly supporting the 
South Sudan Army (SPLA) with backup from the Ugandan People’s Defense Forces (UPDF). Because of their 
entrenched and incompatible interests, the roles of Sudan and Uganda in the peace process have been 
disparaging to IGAD’s mediation efforts in South Sudan (Getachew, 2015:2). 
During the peace process, even though all above mentioned obstacles faced, they were signed the peace 
agreement. The SPLM/A in Opposition signed on 17 August 2015, whereas the government on 26 August 2015. 
 
The Success of Peace Process  
There were all seventh round of peace talks split in different sessions held mainly in Addis Ababa and Bahir Dar 
town of Amhara region. The talk was held as from 4th of January 2014 to 17th August 2015.One of the 
respondent from the government side noted that the agenda was all about peace, stop fighting, open humanitarian 
corridors, return refugees and form the government for national unity. 
Thus, the success of the IGAD-led mediation endeavors and the international pressure is that a cessation of 
hostilities agreement was signed between parties on 23 January 2014 who agreed to cease the war and hostile 
propaganda to each other and protection of civilian and also the parties agreed to form a Monitoring and 
Verification Mechanism (MVM) under the leadership of IGAD (IGAD, 2014:3-4). Moreover, the parties were 
signed an agreement on the status of detainees, who committed to effort to speed up the release of the political 
detainees, an all-inclusive dialogue and National Reconciliation Process to provide enduring solution for the 
conflict (IGAD, 2014). On 9 May 2014, the two parties in conflict was signed a peace agreement, they agreed to 
stop all hostile activities within 24 hours and also agreed that a transitional government of national unity will 
offer the best chance for the people of South Sudan to take the country forward (IGAD, 2014:2). 
According to Yohannes (2015:51) the IGAD-led mediation efforts have born some successes that comprise: 
the release of seven of the eleven political detainees and allowed them to join the peace talks in Addis Ababa in 
February and from 6-7 June 2014, an inclusive IGADled symposium was held in Addis comprised over 250 
South Sudanese representing the government, the opposition, political parties, faith-based groups and civil 
society organization meant to initiate the inclusive phase of the mediation process. The deployment of IGAD 
Monitoring and Verification Team like in Bor, Jonglei and Bentiu regions intended to monitor the 
implementation of Cessation of Hostilities (COH) signed between conflict parties and the authorization of IGAD 
a Protection and Deterrent Force (PDF) from the region as its part. However, as one of the interviewee from the 
opposition side described that the overall success was achieved in 17 August 2015. 
 
The Resolutions and Implementation of Peace Agreement 
The resolution of the conflict started with the signing of the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the 
Republic of South Sudan by the parties to the conflict on Monday 17th August 2015 and by the President of the 
Republic of South Sudan Salva Kiir on Wednesday 26th August 2016, an agreement has eight chapters. In 
Chapter One they agreed to form Transitional Government of National Unity; Chapter Two: deal with Permanent 
Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangement; Chapter Three: decided on Humanitarian Assistance and 
Reconstruction; Chapter Four: concerning the issues of Resource, Economic and Financial Management; 
Chapter Five is about Transitional Justice, Accountability and Healing; Chapter Six: decided on Parameters of 
Permanent Constitution; Chapter Seven: talk about the formation of Joint Monitoring and Evaluation 
Commission (JMEC) to implement the agreement, and finally they agreed on the Supremacy of this Agreement 
and Procedures for Amendment of the Agreement (IGAD, 2015).  
 
Conclusion 
Therefore, the evidences show that the IGAD-led mediation team was used the power based approach mediate 
the parties in conflict during the peace talk. In consequence of, the warring parties were/are not happy by IGAD-
led peace process and enthusiastic to implement the peace agreement. Because they considered the peace 
agreement was signed by the influence of international community. Consequently, as the conflicting parties are 
reluctant to be abide by and implement the peace agreement, the peace accord in brining sustainable peace in 
South Sudan is very contentious and it has also the prospect to be collapsed peace concord. 
 
Recommendation 
The researcher studied from the beginning of the peace process up to the initial stage of implementation of the 
peace agreement. Because the issue of implementation of the peace agreement is ongoing and it needs further 
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study, the researcher couldn't cover the entire process of implementation of peace agreement in the study. 
Therefore, the implementation of Peace Agreement relies on the commitment and political will of the 
warring parties. So the international community should exert pressure on both warring parties so as to speed up 
the implementation process of Peace Agreement because the South Sudanese are suffering by intense security 
problems and food crisis associated with the conflict up until now. Besides, the international community should 
exclude, those who are uncompromising and create impediment to the implementation of the Peace Accord, from 
the rank of Transitional Government of National Unity (TGONU). Because the evidences indicate that both 
belligerent parties leaders are not portrayed their political will and good faith to implement the Peace Concord. 
On the South Sudanese side, the warring parties and other stakeholders should implement the peace 
agreement as they signed for the well-being and amelioration of their societies of South Sudanese rather than 
condemn and complain the international community's for imposed peace agreement. In addition, they should 
develop the culture of tolerance and peaceful means of conflict resolution rather than solving the dispute by 
military means; they should build up the strong national identity and sense of solidarity among the 
heterogeneous communities of South Sudanese by accepting their culture, ethnic, linguistic and religious 
diversity. 
Moreover, they should establish strong institutions to run the country to the path of development and to 
ensure sustainable peace for their communities. And also they should enforce law to mitigate the pervasive 
corruption which create suspicious and lack of trust among communities on their leaders. 
On the IGAD side the IGAD member countries should work hard in order to ensure the peace and security 
of their countries in particular and the region in general by putting aside their vying interest for regional power as 
well as they should follow the same route to solve any interstate and intra-state conflict that arise. 
On the AU side, the AU has a mandate to intervene in the internal affairs of member countries conflicts. 
Therefore, it should look for the immediate solution to the conflict before escalating into violence and mass 
killing rather than contributing troops for peace keeping after the fighting breakout. 
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